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Privilege against Self-Incrimination
Does Not Bar Seizure of Personal Papers

In Andresen v. Maryland,I the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to the forcible seizure, with valid search warrants, of an attorney's incriminatory
personal business records from his office.' Petitioner Andresen, a sole practitioner specializing in real estate settlements, came under the scrutiny of
a Bi-County Fraud Unit investigating real estate settlement activities in
the Washington, D.C., area. The investigation revealed that Andresen,
while acting as settlement attorney, had defrauded the purchaser by knowingly concealing two existing liens on the property. The investigators concluded that there was probable cause to believe the petitioner had committed the state crime of false pretenses 3 and were issued search warrants
permitting them to search for specified documents relating to the sale and
conveyance of the purchaser's property. The law-enforcement officers
seized 80 documentary items from the petitioner's office and corporation
files pertaining to the real estate transaction under investigation.
At a full suppression hearing prior to trial, the trial court suppressed 62
of the seized items. The trial court ruled that admitting into evidence the
documents that were not suppressed would not violate the Fifth Amendment. The court reasoned that the search and seizure did not force Andresen to be a witness against himself, since he had neither been required to
produce the seized documents nor been compelled to authenticate them.'
The Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, affirming in part the falsepretenses conviction, concluded that the search had not violated
Andresen's Fifth-Amendment rights because he had not been compelled
to incriminate himself.5 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari and
affirmed the judgment of the Maryland appellate court.
One who is accused of a crime is privileged from compelled selfincrimination under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal
Constitution.' The "historic function" of the constitutional privilege
1.

_ U.S. - , 96 S. Ct. 2737 (1976).
2. In addition, the Court held that the warrants authorizing the search satisfied FourthAmendment standards of specificity despite their closing reference to "other fruits, instrumentalities and evidence of crime at this [time] unknown." Id. at 2739, 2748-2749.
3. MD. ANN. CODE art, 27, §140 (1976).
4. At trial, the prosecution introduced into evidence eight documents related to the purchaser's property, one of which contained memoranda and drafts written in the petitioner's
handwriting. The authentication of the documents was made by a witness for the prosecution.
96 S. Ct. at 2742-2745.
5. 24 Md. App. 128, 331 A.2d 78 (1975).
6. See 21 AM. JuR. 2D Criminal Law §349 (1965), Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 8 (1964).
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against self-incrimination has been to protect a "natural individual from
compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or his own personal
records." 7 Recent decisions, however, have eroded the protection by using
the Fourth Amendment as a limitation on the scope of the Fifth.' After
Andresen, the privilege protects, in effect, only oral testimony.
In Boyd v. United States,' the Supreme Court invalidated, on Fourth
and Fifth Amendment grounds, an order from a district judge demanding
that defendant Boyd produce an invoice allegedly in violation of an
import-duty statute. The Court found that a mandatory production of the
defendant's private records to be used in evidence against him in effect
compelled the defendant to incriminate himself." The Court in Boyd recognized the intimate relation between the Fourth and Fifth Amendments;
it said that the Fifth-Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
placed limitations on the items of evidence subject to compulsory production under the Fourth Amendment." The Court's emphasis on protection
of private papers from governmental intrusion was based on the substantial Fourth Amendment privacy interest that inspired a new "zone of privacy that [could] not be invaded by the police through raids, by the
legislators through laws, or by magistrates through the issuance of warrants." 3 The Court in Andresen held that the Fifth Amendment does not
protect against the valid seizure of personally incriminating business records, and thus it severely limited Boyd.
The recent decision in Couch v. United States 3 redefined the principles
articulated in Boyd. There, the defendant contested an Internal Revenue
summons, directed to her accountant, to produce business documents that
she had given the accountant over a period of more than 14 years and that
the accountant had used in preparing her income-tax returns.' When the
7. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701 (1944). See also Morgan, The Privilege
Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1949).
8. In United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944), the Court refused to allow the privilege
to be applied to corporate records. Similarly, in Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974),
records from a law practice were held to fall outside the area of protection afforded by the
Fifth Amendment. See also Couch v. United States, 409 U.S. 322 (1973); Fisher v. United
States, 96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976).
9. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
10. Id. at 634-635.
11. "[The 'unreasonable searches and seizures' condemned in the Fourth Amendment
are almost always made for the purpose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself,
which in criminal cases is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man 'in a
criminal case to be a witness against himself,' which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment,
throws light on the question as to what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have been unable to perceive that the seizure of
a man's private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is substantially different
from compelling him to be a witness against himself." Id. at 633.
12. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 313 (1967) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
13. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
14. Id. at 324.

SELF-INCRIMINATION

19771

accountant complied with the summons, the defendant asserted that her
Fifth-Amendment rights had been violated. 5 While she conceded that the
accountant possessed the documents, she contended that a summons by
the government would require the "forcible and compulsory extortion of a
man's own testimony or of his private papers to be used as evidence to
convict him of crime,"' 6 a concept also condemned by Boyd. The Court
held that the Fifth Amendment did not prohibit the production of the
defendant taxpayer's business records in her accountant's, not her own,
possession and that she had no reasonable expectation of privacy that
would bar production under either the Fourth Amendment or the Fifth.'7
The Couch decision, then, says that the Fifth Amendment bars the compelled production by subpoena of property within the possession of the
accused.'8 It does not, however, address the search-and-seizure problem as
applied to the Fifth Amendment.
In holding that the Fifth-Amendment privilege against selfincrimination did not apply to the seizure, pursuant to lawful search warrants, of the petitioner's incriminatory business records, the Court in
Andresen relied most heavily on the recent decision of Fisher v. United
States.9 The Court held in Fisher that an attorney's production, pursuant
to a lawful summons, of a client's tax records in his control did not violate
the Fifth-Amendment privilege of the taxpayer "because enforcement
against a taxpayer's lawyer would not 'compel' the taxpayer to do anything, and certainly would not compel him to be a 'witness' against himself."' 0 While the Andresen Court did recognize the incriminating effect of
the seized documents, it chose to follow the frequently quoted remark of
Justice Holmes: "A party is privileged from producing the evidence, but
not from its production."" To support its position, the Court drew a distinction between the methods used to discover evidence; the Fifth Amendment privilege covered production of evidence compelled by subpoena, the
Court said, but not procurement by seizure.n The majority said a contrary
15.
16.

Id. at 324-25.
Id. at 330, citing Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).

17.

409 U.S. at 327-336.

18. "[lit is clear that Couch only addresses itself to the accountant-client privilege in a
limited context. Couch holds that the Fifth Amendment right not to incriminate oneself
through the production of personal records extends only to a person who is himself in possession of such records." Comment, Couch v. United States: The Supreme Court Takes A Fresh
Look At The Attorney-Client Privilege - Or Does It?, 62 Ky. L.J. 263, 264 (1973-74).
19.

96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976).

20. Id. at 1571.
21. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457, 458 (1913). The majority also observed that
the Fifth-Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "adheres basically to the person,
not to information that may incriminate him." 96 S.Ct. at 2745, citing Couch v. United
States, 409 U.S. at 328.
22. The Court grasped a narrow thread when it maintained that "although the Fifth
Amendment may protect an individual from complying with a subpoena for the production
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determination would undermine earlier decisions and prohibit the admission of evidence traditionally admitted in criminal actions despite the
Fifth-Amendment guarantees.23 Indeed, in Andresen the Court maintained
that the introduction of business records into evidence after their procurement by skillful investigation did not offend any of the policies underlying
the Fifth-Amendment privileges, especially if the statements were voluntarily committed to paper before their seizure."
Finally, the Court "recognize[d]" the protection of an individual's privacy afforded by the Fifth Amendment, but it explicitly restricted the
extent of that privilege.2 5 Referring once again to Fisher, the Court
concluded:
[Ulnless incriminating testimony is "compelled," any invasion of privacy is outside the scope of the Fifth Amendment's protection, [because]
"the Fifth Amendment protects against 'compelled self-incrimination not
[the disclosure of] private information.' "26
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan concluded that the admission
into evidence of Andresen's business documents was a direct violation of
his constitutionally protected "zone of privacy."27 He perceived "no distinction of meaningful substance ' ' 2' between production of evidence compelled by subpoena and production secured against the will of the petitioner through the use of a warrant. Justice Brennan maintained that the
issue could not be resolved on any simplistic concept of compulsion and
that the majority had misinterpreted the holding of Couch, in which the
actual possession of the documents was decisive in determining whether
there was an element of personal compulsion.2 9 In a final reference to Boyd,
Brennan reiterated the interplay between the Fourth and the Fifth Amendments in their protection against the invasion of an individual's right "of
personal security, personal liberty and private property, 2' 3 and he noted
the failure of the majority to give effect to that concept.
of his personal records in his possession because the very act of production may constitute a
compulsory authentication of incriminating information, see Fisher v. United States, supra,
a seizure of the same materials by law enforcement officers differs in a crucial respect - the
individual against whom the search is directed is not required to aid in the discovery, production, or authentication of incriminating evidence." 96 S. Ct. at 2745 (emphasis added).
23. Id. at 2745-2747.
24. Id. at 2747.
25. Id.
26. The Court reminded us again that Andresen was not compelled to testify in any
manner; the Court cited Fisher v. United States, 96 S. Ct. at 1576.
27. 96 S. Ct. 2737, 2750-2751. The dissenting opinion quotes from Bellis v. United States,
417 U.S. 85, 87-88 (1974): "The privilege applies to the business records of the sole proprietor
or sole practitioner as well as to personal documents containing more intimate information
about the individual's private life."
28. 96 S. Ct. at 2750.
29. Id. at 2751-2752.
30. 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
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The Court in Andresen sanctioned its assault on the Fifth Amendment
by refusing to find any suggestion of compulsion in the seizure of the
petitioner's papers. The Court acknowledged that the evidence in question
was incriminating and that the Fifth Amendment protects certain zones
of privacy; it found neither consideration to be relevant if there was no
compulsion. 3 The Court endeavored to justify its finding of no compulsion
by distinguishing between production by subpoena and production by seizure; the authentication of documentary items obtained by subpoena may
incriminate the holder, the Court said, but the risk of authentication would
be absent if the items were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant.
According to Andresen, then, an accused's privilege against compelled
self-incrimination is confined to cases requiring oral authentication of
documentary evidence, obtained either by subpoena or by valid search
warrant, since compulsion now is applicable only to oral testimony nothing else.
Andresen drove the Fourth and Fifth Amendments further apart. When
the Court chose to rely primarily on the Fourth Amendment in its conclusion that a valid search and seizure precluded any element of personal
compulsion, it severely restricted the petitioner's Fifth Amendment protection against self-incrimination. The Court used the Fourth Amendment
as a justification to circumvent Fifth Amendment protections at the expense of the accused; incriminating documentary evidence may now be
secured through the medium of a search warrant. The result is a hollow
Fifth Amendment guarantee against the compelled production of incriminating documentary material and a substantial limitation of an individual's expectation of privacy.
Ross MCCLOY
31. The Court in Couch held that compulsion is evident when an accused is forced to
authenticate documentary items, and Fisher further restricted the reach of the Fifth Amendment when the Court held that compulsion is evident when a testimonial communication is
involved.

